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CHAPTER2
INTRODUCTION
A careful study of the Freneh Communist Party's history
provides ample evidence to prove that this group closely
follows the Soviet line .. whether by direct orders from
Mow, or by attentive observation of the Soviet's movers
is immaterial ' There is no other logical explanation of
the Party's zigzags in 1933, E 1939, end, 1941* However, the
more fundamental problem to be resolved concerns the justi-
fication for so-tortuous a policy. The French Communists
today era extremely proud of their record, and they claim
to be the only party that has consistently pursued a pro-
gram designed for the good of Freeness There are many
Frenchmen, though, who not only fail to agree with such
statement but who also accuse the Communists of having be.
trayed France* in a moment of crisis*
Since the French Communist Party is not an expended
force but is an even greater factor in present-day France
than before the ware an examination of this Party's develop.
sent and especially of its actions during the controversial
period from 1939 to 1941 may prove to be of some assistance
in evaluating its role at that time and in the France and
Europe of today.
9This period is so recent that objective works on it are
conspicuously leaking, and even mans of the primary sources
such as government files are still either unpublished or un-
available here. Nevertheless, with the material at hand,
let us attempt to determine the nature of the French Commu-
riot Party's policy and whether this policy was the wisest
one for the French people and therefore was justified*
CHAPTER
DEVELOPMENT OF THE PARTY PROM 1920 TO 1089
t The French Communist Party, formed in 1990, had devel-
oped into such a well-knit organisation by 1989 that it
could suffer the serious shocks of that period end still
emerge as * powerful unit in French life. What were the
basic elements which comprised this success story?
One of them certainly was the Party's ability to
overcome internal rebellions in sucha way that only in-
dividuals were lost, newer significant segments of the
Party itself which might hove led to its disintegration.
Another element was the conquering of the electoral lump
that the Communists experienced in the early 1930'a,
sothat by the end of the decade they had a more sizable rep.
resentation in the national legislature... he Popular
Front period, during which the Communists cooperated with
the Socialists and Radicals, was significant because it
sided, in the Communist Psrty's growth and bonus. it par-
tially explains the strong antagoisms between these groups
in 19891 while the tracing of the Party's foreign policy
is both a key to and a reflection of the principal reversals
Which the Communists executed in 1935 and 1939.
Now let us develop these elements in order to under*
4stand more fully this party and its conduct whim Prance be.
came involved in World War II
Formation of the Party
In 1920 et Tours the French Socialist Congress was
split into faotions that soon proved to be •completely
compatible. The Central Executive Committee of the Third
International, child of the newly-formed workers, republic,
had sent to the French Socialist Party a list of twenty-one
conditions to be met uncompromisingly before the French
-Party would be accepted into this world organisation. Some
of these conditions included: the strict censorship of the
Party press by proved Communists, purification of the Party
at regular intervals, the use of any means to obtain its
goal, the carrying out of all orders of the Communist
International and its Executive Committee, and various
hints and admonitions on the methods of propagandizing
workers. Should the answer be "yes" or "no"?
One wing of the Socialist Party consisted of extrem.
ists such as Marcel Cochin and L. 0. Prosaard who loudly
demanded that the Congress accept the twenty one conditions
so that through world unity workers might gain more power.2
	1Gerard Walter,:	0 a du Per
	
Parisi Aimery Somogy
dap 44 144
5Facing these advocates were doubters 4w men like Leon Blum,
Renaudel, and Paul Fevre who saw no chance of an internation-
ally representative party but only one directed by a foreign
power, Russia. They also foresaw, besides foreign control
of the French Party, a change in party methods from the tra•
ditionally legal French ones to clandestine ones of Russianex raction
For a brief moment, conciliatory tendencies, flickered
as the Marseillaise end the common memory of :sures over.
whelmed the delegates, bat these were quickly gutted out
by terse telegrams from Soviet leaders urging a definite
break with the doubting centrists, and by the appearance
of the stern old German militant, Clara Zetkin, who person-
ally reiterated these instructions.   By a three to one vote
the Congress joined the Third International, The French
Communist Party was born, but the dissenters remained in the
old Socialist group, to be a source of friction in the fu.
ture*
late a Development
The practical work of party organisation followed this
formal beginning by the French Communists, and one of their
most critical advisers was the fiery Leon Trotsky, who be.
1Walter, 22,	*.r pp. 41•420t
6same the permanent reporter to the Third International on
Party affairs in France. His aim was to build a truly or.
genie unit that actually revolved around the worker, so
one of his first suggestions concerned l'Humanite (the
\	,
official newspaper of the French Communist Party) in which
he urged that they substitute extremely simple language and
oft-repeated (latch phrases for the current vague and diffi.
cult style * Trotsky also advocated a merciless censuring
of all men and programs of the Social•Democratic type, com-.
promisors of the revolution*
From 1921 to 1923 squabbles over baste theories and
petty jealousies flared in the French Party so Moscow sent
several high officials there to bring unity and a leader.
ship favorable to the Third International * These Comintern
officials demanded, for one thing, that the French Party
stop hedging on the Masonic question and bluntly announce
that all Communists who refused to give up their Masonic
affiliations would be expelled from the Party. This ulti-
matt= and the feet that the Russian officials seemed to
support Boris Souverine, the French representative to the
Comintern, were extremely disturbing to Froseard, who was
the Secretary of the French Communist party et that time,
Be had had several disagreements with Souvarine because he
felt the latter wanted to follow the Moscow line too tens
ciously. After several preliminary skirmishes over this
7dissention Frossard resigned from the Party, accusing it of
becoming "Jesuitical and a group of so-called "centrists"
area either ousted or followed Frossard's example.
L'Humanite announced on January 8, "The ranks of the
Party are purified."
During the middle twenties a movement toward greater
Bolshevization of the Party"2 wee pushed by the French
Communist leaders following the instigation of the Comintern.
The goal of this program was still greater centralisation
of the party and another attempt to make the individual work-
era the actual basis of this pyramided structure. To accom-
plish this, the cell system was inaugurated. The cell, OPw
ganized at the place of work became the basic unit; and
these units were gathered into twenty-seven large regions,
instead of the previous forty-eight departments into which
the Communists had organised the French Party, Although
there was some dissatisfaction at first because of the con.
fusion Which this reorganization entailed, the bolehevisa.
tion was consistently advocated by Maurice Mores, artising
young militant at the head of the. Party's Bureau of
Organi-zation,2 because he believed that the 'temporary confusion
would eventually give way to a stronger, more firmly rooted
224,	p, 122.
plaid, pit 17a.
aparty*
This drive to strengthen the French Party had scarcely
begun When the Trotaky*Zinoviev break in the Third Interns.
tional caused repercussions in France in the Souvarine.
Treint disputes Souvarine criticized "an excessive central-
ism and a too mechanical discipline" in the Party1 and sup*
ported Trotsky in the latter's  interest in the world revs.
lutions while Trient, Secretary of the French Party, proved
to be a better politician and backed Zinovies i
 The Fifth
World Congress of the Comintern excluded Souvarine from
the Communist Party and branded his followers, including
men like Roamer, Monett., and Musts, as Trotskyites end
their group as that of the "Right". 2 These recurrent
sensions within the Party's leadership failed to aid in the
promotion of the Revolution, and the Cahiers du 21.2kri...1S10
(the monthly journal of the Party) remarked that at this
point one could discern 1,20 Jauressism, 10% Marxism 20%
Leninism, 20% Trotskyism, and 30% cionfusionism'a
The decline in the membership which the Party suffered
from 1920 through 1932 provided the setting for the last
iWalter, m 0
	
p* 177
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9important internal threat to the French Communists unti
1939. The central figure this time was Jacques Doriot,
that "spoiled child of the Communist Party"? as Marcel
Cochin once. remarked. Doriot was the most popular Com*
munist leader throughout the twenties, both with the masses
and with members of Parliament; and when in the 1932 oleo.
Woos he and Clamamue were the only Communists elected on
the first ballot, he began formulating plans for a new
workers, party, which he alone would head. 2 The Central
Committee of the Communist International tried to restrain
Doriot from this rash move but he considered this a sign
of weakness and his self-confidence increased, so the re.
suit wits Doriot's expulsion from the Party in 1934. sow.
ever, the feared loss in the Communist ranks failed to
materialize to any large extent because within a year the
drive toward the Popular Front and the ensuing Party expan-
Sion had renewed the Communist strength.
Although the French Communist Party instructs its
candidates for Parliamentary seats to remember that the
°enter of gravity of their political life is definitely out-
aide of Parliament ,8 the Party has always made a concerted
%Walter,	o 	p * 095.
2V40► p it 2460
3114 p. 141,
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effort to win votes because through its members of Parliament
and the campaigns which aid in their elections the Party is
able to influence a larger number of citizens than merely
through Party channels*
Following is a brief resume of the Communist Party elec.
torsi strength in Prone* during this period/
rear Votes Seats
1924 6750/2 21,
1928 1,063,945 14
1932 764,036 10
1935 1,495,503 /2
The Party's initial partiotpation in the national oleo.,
Lions in 1924 was considered a smashing success, and on May
21 the critical Zinovtev wired/ "The Executive Committee of
the Communist International notes with satisfaction that Mu,
French Communist Party has become a great Communist Party
and that it effected its electoral campaign with an intran.
sigeance of absolutely irreproachable principles as true
Communists ought to do. "l
From the chart above there would seem to be an error,
because although the number of votes that Communists re.
*laved increased noticeably in 1928 they **twiny lost thir.
teen Parliamentary seat* * The explanation is found in the
different electoral systems used, In 1924 the scrutin,
1Walter, o Cit. * Pt 149.NAMOMOI■ -
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1440 adopted during the World War * wee still in effect,
and under it, each party submitted a list of candidates for
a whole district. The votes were tabulated and, by a very
complicated method, each party was assigned the number of
Seats proportional to its total number of. votes. The old
system of tuttala;d t prpndiellempnIA readopted by 1928, pro..
vtded that parties nominate one candidate for each electoral
district and that if no one candidate received a majority
vote en the first ballot * a run-off ballot would occur
week later. This system obviously encouraged coalition votes
on the second ballot and tended to strengthen parties of the
center.
Since in ,-1928 the Communist Party refused to cooperate
with the others * it experienced a definite drop in Parliamen-
tart' representation * but la 1932 the continued decline was
mainly due to an actual loss of votes, although the system
was responsible in certain instances? The seventy-two
1Wslter, 224, 21140 pp. 234.23S, illustrates:
is the Soine..etoliarne district, there wire four candi-
dates en the first ballets The Communist obtained 2,513
votes; the Socialist, 10 426; the Radical, 1,999; end the
Conservative* 2'201. The Socialist and Radios* candidates.
withdrew before the second voting. The Communist received
4,113 votes on the second ballot, while the Conservative
received 4,199 and was elected.
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seats which the Communists won in 1936 were a direct result
of the Popular Front policy, and although this cooperation'
didn't last long, the Party had an important share of the
Parliamentary seats when the crisis of 1939 arrived,,.
'rho Popular Front
During 1929 and 1930 the French Communist Party's in.
fluence and membership &valued drastically, L'Humanite
underwent a financial crisis. Feebleness seemed to pre.
rail throughout the ranks * The Socialist Party, however,
continued to be strong. Tharea tilt that the baste explan-
ation for the Socialists' strength was that the Socialist
leaders had not been in power am yet so they could continue
to lure the masses to their standards with speeches alone,
Besides, no economic crisis to test the parties had occured,1
The Communist solution to this situation was to try to
win the Socialist workers over to cooperation with the
munista but at the same time to unmask the Socialist leaders
as traitors to the working class. This polio, however, pro.
duced disappointing results, as the Party discolored in the
1032 elections. Nevertheless, the Communist leaders pursued
it for another two years.
lwalter , 22A.	 p. 216.
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The Socialist Party was also anxious for cooperative\\
action between the two workers' parties, and several abortive,\
attempts at coalition.were tried from 1932 to 1934. The
fascist threat in Germany caused the German Socialists toJ\
petition the Second and Third Internationals to Stop their
interparty strife in order that both the workers' parties
might unite throughout Europe in the face of this critical
situation. The conditions Which the Communist Internationals
submitted to the Socialists were wholly acceptable to the
latter .. except for the final	which declared that
the Communist Parties would still try to proselyte the
Socialist workers. The negotiations halted abruptly.
On February 6, 1934 there was rioting in Paris, result.
trig from a clash between demonstrator. of fascist leanings
and those of the Communist and Socialist Parties„ The
Socialist leaders suggested that this was an appropriate
time to commonce some kind of active cooperation, but the
conditions on which the Communists insisted were again un-
compromising so the conclusion of this attempt was unsue•
easeful like the previous one.
When a number of Socialists joined the Congress of
Amsterdam pesos group, to which many Communists belonged,
and this body issued a joint anti-Fascist declaration in
April 1934, rumors that the parties were finally in agree.
meat began to fly; but Thores, in order to dispel such
14
popular conclusions wrote in the April 13 l'Humanite: We
do not wish to be joined with the Social-Democrats. One
does not marry water to fire.1
Within a few months, however, the Communist and
Socialist leaders were actively cooperating, and by 1955
the Radical Party was included in this coalition. This
change seemed to be a very sudden one to the public. After
curtly refusing the Socialist proposals for so long, Thereat
on June 23, 1934 at the Party Conference in Ivry * made hies
customary denunciations of the Social-Democrats but added
`We do not want fascism to come to Prance.
That is why we wish at a	price to accomplish
the union with the Socialist workers againstfascism. 2
And although there is some evidence to show that the
Communist leaders in Prance had discussed the possibility
of am entente with the Socialist Party directors as early
ad January, 1934, 3 this swerve in the party line, whether
it occurred in January or June of 1934, marked a definite
contradiction of the previous fourteen years policy.
The drive toward united actions once begun, moved
rapidly. On July 2 both Socialist and Communist leaders
1Walter, Iv sit., p. 980.
2atti
q111, p. 218*
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spoke at a large joint meeting in Paris, end the principal
theme of both representatives seemed to emphasise the fu-
ture gains that were possible now that the workers were 00*
operating. By the end of this month, a Communist-Socialist
Pact was signed by these French putties which was aimed
against any further fascist growth in ?ranee and even pro-
posed the ,dissolution of ouch fascist groups as the gmi
de Feu This agreement also included a truce in the inter*
party verbal warfare so that the accomplishment of their
common goal--to defeat fascism and to win workers' benefits
4N. might not be hindered * This entente soon embraced an-
other important group, that of the middle classes, because
Whores had been negotiating with Radical Party leaders, and
on Bastille Day 1935 0 the Popular Front, as this wide (mall*
tion became known, paraded in Paris,
What is the explanation for this about -face, prior to
which the Communists had denounced the Socialist leaders as
"traitors to the working class" and after which these same
Communists held out a cooperative hand 0* not only to these
same Socialist leaders but also to the bourgeois Radicals?
Certainly the earlier attempt of the Party to gain
strength by trying to attract only the Socialist workers
had failed in the 1932 elections, so it is possible that the
French Communists believed that at least a temporary coali-
tion with the successful Socialist Party was the only cure
for its electoral slump * The second explanation *.* that of
16
the fascist threat in France ••wee the one cited by the
Party at that time, It is true that such ultra-conservative
Live organisations as the Action Francaise and the gala de
Feu had, with their show of military foree and cry for a
more authoritarian government, terrified the Republican
French. And the fascist threat to. Socialists and Communists
in Germany had by then become a reality, although Hitlerian
Germany was not yet recognised as a menace to Francs. The
third hypothesis concerning this Communist reverse concluded
that new orders had arrived from Moscow, but as Leon Blum
(who propounded this explanation) added, "What motivated
Moscow in this step?".
In answer to his own question Blum wrote:
■
The February Fascist soar* had permitted the
Soviet to begin its change in front, the necessity
for which had been realised since littler had as.
cended to power in 1933 and had threatened an east-
ward expansion, Look for no other cause for the
1104P, diplomacy, Litvinovs s trips, Russia's en.
trance into the League of Nations. The Soviet
Government wished to guarantee the security of it*
European front by a system of international
agreements... At the same time that the Soviet
ap-roachee the French government, it looks for a
point of support from the French messes grouped
around the idea of an anti-fascist struggle."
One historian comments:
ltialter, 22.1. eitz,	290.
The ascension of Hitler constituted a'grave
menses to the U.S.S.R., for he did not hide his
desire for expansion toward the Bast to gain
Ilhenoreur4 The Soviet resigned herself to seek..
rWg- alliii among the capitalistic countries ....
In each of which she was supported by the Com
munist Parties.
All of these factors probably figured in this ,reversal
by the French Communist Party in 1954, but regardless of the
reasons, the Popular Front that was formed proved to be a
*smashing suceess in its first test, the 1936 elections,
This coalition of the three leftist parties left the Right
in ruins' but when the cabinet was formed by Leon Blum, one
aloud appeared in the political sky. The Communists, who
had benefited most from the electoral bargain, 2 refused to
enter this government, although 'Mores pledged his Party's
loyal support. This meant that there would be always present
Left Party which was not Involved In the immediate respon-
sibilittee of government.- Aware of this Leon Blum addressed
this warning to the Communists:
I sincerely hope that the Government Which the
Socialist Party is going to form will not be the
Kerensky Government But, if it were to be so, be.
lieve me, in the France: or today it is not Lenin
who would replace it.40
Leon de Hiedmatten„ 149114p14224
 (Versailles:
tditions Ike L'Observateur„	 .
D.W. Brogan, France Republic,  (London:Harper end Brothers, "TTIWY).,
a bids 1p. 703.
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The French workers expected immediate results from
their political victory; and 'even before the new Government
took office they began to occupy the factories, demanding,
in these strikes, wage increases and various improved work-
ing conditions. From May 26 to 28 these strikes spread
rapidly throughout France, with a sooond wave of them the
first week in June. The discipline end self-confidence of
the strikers has led certain historians to conclude that the
strikes were planned and directed by the syndicalists and
unofficially by Oommunists, 1 but others explain that the
workers could, quite logically, have expected no opposition
from the new Leftist government and so this was the reason
for the calmness and self-assurance exhibited during the
strikes.2 At any rate, the Socialist Cabinet acted prompt•
ly to settle the situation because it feared that these
Work stoppages might alienate public opinion against the
Popular Front. The Government obtained for the strikers
several concessions from the large industrialists, and-the
forty-hour week was adopted by Parliament * The Government
and many economists saw that this shorter work week would
lower French ability to compete in the world market, but
the measure was necessary to bring peace to the industrial
Scene,
1Walter„ 2EL °it* p. 313,1,
2Brogen, op * cit., p* 704#
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As usual, there were extremists wham the settlement
did not satisfy, and strikes dragged on in certain areas,
However, when Thorez saw these prolonged strikes creste an
uneasiness in the middle classes from which he perceived
the Right might profit, he urged immediate cessation of the
strikes, saying, "It is necessary to know when to end e
strike."
on the whole, the Popular Front Government coped
rather successfully with its domestic! problems during 1936,
but foreign policy issues led to serious controversies with.
in the Leftist bloc: The Spanish Republic to the south also
had a Popular Front Government, so when it was threatened by
the France-led Rightist forces, the French masses naturally
sympathised with the Spanish Loyalists, and many Frenchmen
urged the Government to send aid to their republican neigh.
ben.. The French Communists were very outspoken in their
demand for intervention on behalf of the Spanish Government
because they feared a France victory over the Spanish Left.
ists and because the Soviet was materially reinforcing the
Loyalists. Blum made the difficult decision to remain
strictly neutral, for he believed that intervention would
lead to war with Germany and Italy end that it France chose
1Walter, szt oat,, pi BRO.
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Madrid she would lose London? No matter how well-founded
Blunts reasons might have been, this decision broke the
spirit of the Popular Front, and soon other differences led
to the loss of any unity among the Leftist parties.
By February 1937 the Blum Government called for a
*pause* in its reform program in order to *consolidate the
ground we have conquered",2 but to the Right this was
signal that the peoples , government was weakening; and to
the extreme Left this was an admission by the Government
of its failure to fuiltill its promises to the workers,
Incidents followed rapidly •. Blum f s resignation; the
asoension of the Chautemps Radical Government; its resign*.
tion just before Austria capitulated to Germany; a second
attempt and failure by Blum to form a cabinet; and in April
1938 the ascendancy of the Daladier Government. By this
time, the Popular Front that had been dead in spirit for
some time was deed in name as well.
ForeignPolicy
The French Communist Party's foreign policy from 1920
to 1939 can be divided into two distinct period. One might
1Devid Thomson, Democracy (London: Oxford
University Press, 194	p"
	
r ng to this author,
from this period French foreign policy was completely sub•
servient to the British,
2Brogen, 2,4 oit., p. 718,
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call the first one, which lasted until 1935, 1 the anti-
national defense phase which conversely, the second period,
which lasted from 1938 to 1939 0 might be named the pre-
nationalA.defonse phase, Of course this in en over-simpli-
fication, so in the next few pages let us review the in.
portent foreign issues which the French Communist* faced
prier to that controversial period .1. 1939 to 1941,
In the first place, the Party had to settle the ques-
tion of whether war was to be sanctioned in Certain instances,
and, if so, what these instances were. Since many French
Communists had been pacifists in World War I, this was a
problem but by 1922 the official answer had been given by
Boukharine to the Third International:
This problem of national defense which, for
all Communists, was completely clear at the begin.
ning of the war, since it admitted the pure and
simple negation of national defense, presents it.
self in a more compIicated manner now ...The
presence of a proletarian state modifies the whole
situation.... it is necessary in our program
to demand that the proletarian State can and ought
to be defended, not only by the proletariat of the
Country in queation but also by the proletariat of
all other oountries,04.•••The second question is
whether proletarian states ought to form military
blocs with bourgeois stateswii *Of courses if it
is a question of purely strategic and tactical
opportunity...Supposing that a military alli
-ance had been concluded with a bourgeois state, the
duty of the comrades in *soh country would consist
1This date is only approximate because 1934 to 1935
seems to have been a transition period,
29
In contributing to the victory of the bloc of
the two allies.^
In 1928 et the Sixth Congress of the Communist Inter*
national the kinds of ware were discussed and the following
instructions about them were: given to the delegates: All
imperialist wars must be denounced.  Wars in which Como
munists should participate included those imperialist ones
which could be transformed into civil war, those which
would defeat the Communists , own imperialist governments*
and those in which imperialist forces threatened the U.S.S.R?
The French government dispatched occupation troops to
the Ruhr industrial region in 1923, The Communists immedi
ately labeled this move as /imperialistic and started a cam
paign aimed at mass uprisings in France and Germany, for
Moscow still believed that the world revolution was immi*
neat and felt that this situation might be the one to kindle
the revolutionary fire, French Communists held joint meet.
ings with their German brothers to plan methods to further:
fraternization by the French soldiers with the Germans,
German sabotage of the French-controlled industries, and
mass demonstrations in both nations to protest this "impe-
rialist eat," The effort was vocal enough to bring prose*
cution against ten Communist leaders * among them Marcel
Ifturi e Oeyrets La TrahisopPt nente * (Parisi
.11i	- ,4110-Spartacus,11947)*p, IV;
2walters 224.. 21140 p. 194.
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°sifting, fear high treason; 1 but the class uprising failed to
materialises the reason probably being that Frenchmen in
general were too tired of fighting to be aroused to protect
German property.
Since freedom for the Colonial populations has appeared
consistently in Communist platforms, the Riff War in 1924
brought all-out denunciations of the Government's policy of
*subjugation" from the French Communists * Do riot stated in
Parliaments "The soldiers will hold out a brotherly hand
to those whom you call enemies, They will impose the peace
on you."2 Moreover, be and Semerdo another Communist leader,
sent a congratulatory telegram to Abd*eloKrimo the Rift
chief.` The Forty also ordered a protest strike to show
the Government that the workers sided with the Riffs. The
strike occurred on October 12o 1925 and a million workerspa ticipated.4
Throughout these years until 1935 the French Communist
Party thoroughly stigmatised the theory of notional defense,
and in the way of practical action, it refused to vote mill
nary oredits and attempted to undermine authority in the
army. in feat, in 1929 Maurice Thorez was sentenced to six
do Riedr►tten,	p 54.
20eysts att, 18,
bidi
4walter,	°it., p* 151*
2hone
Sports eta
4Ibid
pro`
i4efouvre. Ls P
Nay* 1948)7Pp.
p. 10.11.
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months in prison for "inciting soldiers to disobedience."
The Party attitude toward national defense failed to
alter when Hitler first *am' to power*
On November 11, 1935,	L'Humanite charged:
The bugbear Hitler is a pretext to exact
prompt sanctions that would mean war against the
Reich.
It the war occurred, it would not * as the
*neo* Socialist leaders claim, be a struggle be-
tween democracy and fascism, but between two im,
perialiams which we combat under the same name.2
And in September *Marie• Thorez declared:
Because we subordinate everything to the
necessity of preparing the proletsrist**04for
its dictatorship, our attitude in time of war
would make us determined adversaries of notional
,'defense
As late as March 15 * 1935, Thor*** in answering a group
who had affirmed that the workers would rise to resist a
Hitlertan aggression, stated to Parliaments
We will not permit the working oleos to be
swept into a war to defend democracy against
fssOiem* ***The eltisislist Party deolaroo itself
for national defense, while the Communist Party
remains true to the manifesto of Marx and Engels:
the proletariat has no fatherland**
SS
However, the year 1985 marked a turning point. Whether
the Franco*Soviet pact of friendship, signed in May of that
year, instigated this turn or whether the French Communists
realised only then that Hitlorian Germany was a threat to
the masses as well as to the "two.hundred families," the re..
suit was that the Party began to uphold national defense
end even became noisily patriotic. Thor** began to refer
to France as . "our country that we lovo,"1
In his report to the Party Congress of 1937„ Thor**
urged immediate military aid to the Spanish Loyalists 2 and
blamed the policies of the Government that had allowed
Fascist Italy to conquer Ethiopia and Germany to occupy the
Rhineland* The difference between democratic Franco and
fascist Germany seemed quite obvious by then, end Thores
interned the delegate* that the French Communist Party's
foreign policy for the future was "both democratic and
French .0 a plan for peao*.4
The events of 1938 (slimmed by Munioh were branded by
the French Communists as the treacherma deeds of a few
foes of the masses. On October 7, 193S Thores °barged:
Munioh is not peace. Munich is the attempt
of the English and French reactionaries to come to
halter,	ate.., p. 285.,
Smart** Thor**, Une Politique be Grandeur Francais,
(Poriet Editions Sociales, 1945) 0 p. 158.
3,22.41. p. 172.
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a secret understanding with the German end Italian
fascists; over the heads of the laboring masses of
all countries; over the heads of the small trusting
States; and over the head of the Soviet Union. coun•
try of Seel:aim and peace:.
Prom the autumn of 1938 through August 1939 the Qom.
munista exalted the defense of Prance and of her allies,
especially Ozeshoelovekia and Poland. On November 21,
1958, Thores lashed out at pacifists:
You	hypocrites weaken the combatants
who die for your freedom, your satisfied peso's
To defend Prance against Mier at this noo
menu !tarries a very definite signifiesnce for the
working closes To defend Prance against 'Hitler to
to be loyal tq the international preletertet in
act end not just in words
4-
The Pranee*Anglo4oviet negotiations seemed to drag on
endlessly throughout the summer of 1939, and the French (Tomo
muniats blamed the two western powers for all the delays,
When one Socialist suggested that the eoviets f *excessive
legalism* might be slowing up the conversations, 111r:rite 
branded him as "a falsifier of the negotiation records**5
Consists% ly„ the Communists urged s strong policy to
support Poland, end as late as August 91 0 1939, demanded!
*N0 second Munichi*4
lgaurice Theresa 224st
20ayrat, 224eit" p. 5
4.1121, P 54
215• 
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On August 23, 1950 the GermanoSoviet Pact was signed«
The ?renah Communist Party entered a new eras
CHAPTER III
THE OOMMUNIST8 , "DELICATE PERIOD" 4000
MUST 1►39 TO MX 1941
Augoo;ts to PoPtosb,or 19
The dermanidioviet past forced no oritiesi deelsions upon
the Preneh Communists for several weeks. They interpreted
it as • sign of the D'i lleilloRo l s power to bring peace tee ECM
repo, so they continued to support a strong' national defense
and the rights of Poland.
pEum►ffito declared on August 215s
The conversations in Moscow between the
0.406Ri and Oa many serve the cause of peso*
in Europe
On August 24 a prominent Communist Journalist added*
I repeat that war vocalise yesterday. Already radio
stations are stating that the anti4oviet attempt ••
which pretended that, in eensequence of the Berlin*.
OW, pact, a twenty four hour .ultimatum hie been
sent to Poland concerning Denali oo was a falsehood
to exploit the state of spirit developed in Paris
by a delirious press, The twenty0four hours have
passed' Hitler has not taken Dansig., One would do
well to be suspicious of false newsiA
1Lefeuvre, su Olt, pi 18.
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'These naive statements continued to roll from Communist
presses for several days; end even after Germany had sttsolurd
Poland and Pronee hod dielered war ' September 3, the rreneh
Communists repeatedly praised the Soviet for having tried to
save the pesos * The Party continued to support Polish aid,
end en September 1 the Communist deputies voted war credits.
The patriotic gesture* continued
K. Therm; affirmed;
If Hitler. in spite of everything, begins
war, may he know that be will find before him
thepeople	mof a united pro 	the Communists
in the first rant, in order to defend the security
of the country, the liberty and independence
the people
In * letter to the Senate on September. Mereel Osehin
wrote;
The Yreneh Communist Party maintains the same
attitude toward Hitlerisa. It declares that the
workers have a primal duty; that is to accept the
military measures required by the deverRmeut in
order to defeat Hitler end to guarantee the scour*
ity of the country**
This  sort of deeleratton by Communists appeared re.
peatedly in Fromm during the first holt of September * On
September 1, Russisa armies marched into Poland, end yet on
September 19 the Control Committee of the Party in a joint
10eposti ILL eit p 614
b da p . 63*
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meeting with the Communist deputies at the Chamber of Dew,
ties issued this statements
On the eastern front, the bravery of the
Polish people has not boon able to put a stop
to the loss of the cities and thin meat important
industrial and cultural °enters of this unfortu*
nate country, Guided by the anxiety to serve well
the eau,* of itoolal progress and of Prime, we owl-
not separate the two; we are true to the dealera*
ties made by the General. Seereitery of the French
Communist Party, April SS, 19361 'it is neither
by Rome, nor byBevil*, nor by London, nor even by
Soso*, that the direction of cur' country will Rae
determined, it is by Paris e Viva la Prenee$4
Sines the news of the Russian tnvesion of Poland must
hive reached Parts by September 16, it is hard to under*
stand this &If:aeration by the Freush Communist leaders on
the 19th. One could use it to support the proposition
that the French Party does not take orders from Moscow, ex*
dept for the foot that s immedietely after this statement,
these same leaders remained silent for almost a two-week
period, after which they began an enti*Polioh end defeat.
tat (Pompeian, Under these circumstances the logical
planation of the September 19 text seems to be that it was
as emotional blames' by men who had been defending Poland
for so long that they oouldnft reverse themselves over*
night,
10eyrati stre tat pip 64
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Ek'rennten PeE.1.4
Perhaps the most signifiesnt fact about the Communists
for the rest of September was their complete lack of action.
Their silents* on the war was more notielble than any **piano
*tory words might have been*
On September 20, when Russia end Germany were engaged
in dividing Poland between them, the French Parliament
dissolved the Communist (arty and any other groups which
showed allegiance to the Third Internationally,
la protest, the Communist deputies declared
In the name of the ideal of liberty and
human dignity inscribed on our country's flag,
we energetically protest a decision contrary to
the republican spirit.***
This is the first time that so arbitrary I
mossurew. * .bas been taken against a party of the
working -cleea and the French people.
In our capacity as French deputies, we pro*
claim our indignation which we are 'volitive is
shared by the people of our country.'
Sy September SS the partitioning of Poland was sub,*
stantially complete, and the victors issued * statement
which reaffirmed their mutual cooperation end concluded
that the 24ropesn war could now be successfully ended 4.0
specifisallys
1 eater, o tat, p. SSC.
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mirA sure basis for a durable peace has
been ereated,4"..
The two Governments therefore enter into
common efforts in accord with other friendly
powers in order to arrive as rapidly as possible
at this end. /f, however, the efforts of the
two Governments are not sueoessful the feet will
be undeniably established that England and Prone*
are responsible for the eontinustion of the war.
(Signed) Molotev • Von Ribbentropl
The French Communists, upon the dissolution of their
Party on September 26, had immediately formed themselves
into a new organization, The Workers , and Peasants Group.°
In the name of this organisation, Plorimond Bonte and Arthur
Rosette dispatched their famous letter to President Nerriot
on OotOber 1, This was the first comment by the French
Communists on the foreign situation sine* September 19#
Nero are the essentials of the letter*
&tercel have peace proposals been made,
due to the d plomatis initiatives of the VoS#1,14,
then a controlled press answers in chorus: riot,
Is it possible that peace proposals can be
rejoined even before their details are known sud
without the national and'sovereigs representotive
body having been consulted?
We do not think so, and we ask you, as President
10eyrat, 221 21144k pp. 85.066.
2Walter„	011,41, P. 881.
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of the Chambor, to demands
1,,,Thot Parliament be °ailed to deliberate
in a public session on the problem of pesos;
2 4 That the'doputies in the Army be an.
thorissd to take pert in the deliberations on
this important question, upon which depends the
life or death of millions of Pronohmen,
We dosiro, with ell our might, a just end dur.
able peso. end we think this can be obtained pepa
idly, for in opposition to the imperialist warmongers
and 'Rifler Germany, doh lo a prey to internal eon*
traditions, there stands the might of the Soviet
Union which would permit the realisation of a policy
of collective 00ourity that would *nape pone. and
safeguard the independence of Proneo#4
Since the French Communists had been the most outspoken
critics of Munich and bad (noted loudly for adeistenee for
the *bravo Roles",, 2 many Prenihmen wore unable at first to
comprehend this proposal to oonolud• pests* ()low the Polish
corpse#1
xn Le Pulapli Leon Blum wrote;
?his does of 0311110iem and hypocrisy is phi,*
loslly intelersble#, 0 traut it As necessary to so
lAyond this inetinotivo movement of distsstelp4•40
On rofOotion, whet is most serious in thdo step
taken by the Communist deputies is its servility
what I called the other day tomnioobedienos'.°
An important ?mach Communist leader, Andre Marty, dote
timid to argue in a book written a year later that a Just
10eyrst, 224. 2114,.These excorpte sr, from the complete
text on p. 69.
p 84. '
870M, Ps 70, note 1
peace would have been possible on the basis of the OOMMUn*
iota' letter to Marriott
The country had been at war for a month to
defend Poland but ten days earlier the reactionary
Polish State	that prison of the peoples .. had
ceased to exist, It was clear that the government
of the colonels, led by Beek, had arranged every.
thing in often.** The multi. national Polish State(that artificial creation of Versailles) had eol*
lapsed in three 'weeks It was clear that the so.
tion of the 11,5•Sats end Germany laid a gelid founds.tion for pose, in Eastern Europe and could at thesame tame serve a* a basis for the termination ofthe war in Western Aktropolil
Following the receipt of Bonte ' asend Rentette f e letter
proposing pee**, the Government ordered the arrest of all
Communist deputies, with the exception of those in the
armed fore•ca The polio* arrested thirty-four deputies
at that time, but the number of Communist deputies had
diminished sine, the Russian inmate* of Poland and through.
out October end November the resignationsvhed accumulated
to a tote:I. - of twenty.four# 2 the remainder of the seventy.
two Communists deputies who were not arrested or bed not re►
signed were either in the Army, were arrested later, or es*
oaped the police net*
Besides deputies, the Warty lost nnibereue officers in
Various districts. ?or initanee„ of the thirty-five
	
lAndre Marty,	Trio o	(London* Lawrence a
20eyrat, 424.211 0 p. 87.
IFrench 0	Deputies,1941), pp A	^
or...general of the. Seine, fifteen resigned * It should be
noted that this depletion of the Communist ranks occurred
principally after September 19 and that although * few
promising militants like Marcel Gitten, who resigned in
November, 1 were lost, none of the high-ranking leaders
swerved from the Party line, once it was established on
October 1.
lisurieo Mores, the Secretary General of the Party,
deserted his army post on October 6. In his address to
the Party Congress in June 1945 he explained,
After the suppression of our Party, decreed on
September 26, 1939, the Control Committee made the
wise deetsien, imposed on October 4, to have me
go into clandestine work in my position as Secretary.
General of the Party.... 'hat was our duty to take all
the neooesary measures to try to cheek the Hitler*
tan plots, aiming at the inveatoi and the annihils.
tion. of ?ranee. The. French Communist Party in the
exclusive interest of the people of France, was
obligated to preserve organisations which have
played a role of first magnitude in the struggle
for the national liberation and to assure the
security and the continuity of its direetign and
even to oars for the lives of its leaders.'
One author °loins that Themes was'not even in danger
of being arrested, because he was in the Army and the dew
creel for the arrest of the Communist deputies had stipu.►
let•d *that those who accomplish their duty as soldiers
1W*3.ter, 2b *it ' , Pi 382.
%%ores, sme. sit., p. 288.
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will be sheltered from all prosecutiona. 4 However*
cOmplish their duty" is a vague phrase and most Army *taws
interpreted it to mean "renounce ell Communist ties" so well.
known leaders like Thores actually had little chance of ego.
*aping arrest.]
In the *curse of a debate in the National Assembly on
December 5, 1947, Rightist Deputy Andre Moynet accused
Maurice Thores of having betrayed France by his desertion
in 1939, so the letter rose end defended himself saying:
The Communist Party aided the war effort at
first by voting military credits and urging its
members to join the Army... , 1 was honored es a
soldier by my superiors.
But while we were in uniform no fig tMing was
begun to save Poland. The Government let Germany
erase her•...Xt was my first duty to lead the Party
which was so important to Praneefs welfare.
In response, Renzi, Teitgen * another deputy* noted that
Thores had made two points in'his address: that France
didn't go out to aid Poland and that Thores, with determine•
tion and courage* had fulfilled his job as head of his party
Um* placing his party above his country.
Ilsores answered: "The Communist Party, alone * was
defending my eountry4"2
Covet* mi  oilt* p. 71* note 1.
2:ournol Offlopol, Assemble, Notional*, Dee, 5 1947*
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Mores' aeousation that the French Government did not
attempt to aid Poland in September it socurate * Whether Gush
an attempt would have been successful 11-13 unknown, but it is
possible that a quick French thrust at the RutIrrwouid,lhavtiv-,
relieved Poland and greatly handicapped Germany * At any.
rate this is a point to be remembered in the following
ohapter of analysis * The other point regarding Thereat
duty to hit party first is a fundamental one. Granting for
the moment that this party was working for the bestlintereste
of Prance, had it any right at a minority group to decide
that the laws of the Government (which represented the will
of the majority in s democracy like Prance) could arbitrero
ily be broken? , This is a problem to be pondered while
studying this period it Frances history*
'During the winter of 1.929 a deluge of defeatist prop**
Bands for the masses and instructions for the Communist
itants descended upon France. An example of the difestist
literature wee en open letter to Leon Blum written by Andre
Marty. In it one seeks in Vain for a condemnation of Hitler*
Instead the enemy is pointed out to be the French end English
capitalists whet
looked for e new excuse to justify this werses•snd
found it by coning, it an anti.fasciat struggle*
Ah, K. Miniater (arty continued) do you take
the workers and peasants for imbeciles? They do not
forget that the Communists are the only ones who
judged accurately on *11 the events which happened
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in Prone. and in the world. end above all on the
problems of war and peseeia
George Dimitrov commented on the Socialist leaders
part in the vier in en article in Pravda;
The moral directors of the Second International
play the moat aordid and criminal role in the war.
They fool the masses by preaching the antifascist
character of the war and aid the bourgeolAie in
pushing the people to the slaughterhouse
The addresses made by Moscow leaders were rtoh in de.
festist material.
In October 1939, Molotov declared*
But there isn't the least justification for
a war of this nature. One can accept or reject
the Jiitlerian ideology as well as any other id*.
ologteel system 4.- that is a question of political
views and anyone will understand that an ideology
cannot be destroyed by war.
That is why it le not only useless but criminal
to engage in such a war.
And on November 9 he added
We have always been of the opinion that
strong Germany is a necessary condition of a
solid peace in Europe.'
10eyret, 2112114s p 75#
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The fact that Communist . ►authored leaflets were dropped
in Pismo. by German planes hes been repeatedly alleged and
proved # 1 but that this propaganda was actually prepared for
German distribution by Communists in order to aid the Nazi
war withine does not necessarily follow. It wee perfectly
natural for the Germans to utilise this defeatist propaganda,
but at the same time the Communists could have been working
toward peace without desiring the Naste to be the victors*
There were reprimands as well at instructions from
Moscow for the French Communists, In an organ of the Cow,
intern there appeared an editorial, in December 1439, that
denounced*
moth* opportunism of the Communist Perlis*.
mentary group, ..which did not utilise the special,
Chamber session September 1 to pretext against
the policy of reaction end war of Deledier and the
Socialist leaders and which voted war credits
The Central Committee *omitted grave mistakes; it
did not understand at the time the significance of
the changes Wei* were precipitated at Ihe end of
August and' at the beginning of the war.*
This article seems to, indicate that Communist leaders
are supposed to follow the Nosoew line closely but that the
method ion, at least partially, not one of direct orders
from Moscow but one of consistent interpretation of the
liJournsi Officio1 1 *arch 210. 1940 p* 466*
hefeuvret 224 ekt*A p. 12*
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Soviet's actions» Sometimes the Communist leaders interpret
either incorrectly or haltingly or both.
Ths Pate Of the CommieDoPutits,
zr Oommunist - sourees are to be believed, the ?rent*
Communist deputies who were arrested in October were throw*
lute a prison with the most viOions ortminotle, Ths„441101810
thou not only neglected. the* but also deprived them of ordi*
nery:privilegi0"etiohas writing materials and visitors? it
is difficult to.. determtne the authenticity of this recount*
but at any rate two Communist deputies, Sante and Cornavin
who hod evaded capture to that time, attended the Chamber
session on November 50 to protest the treatment their co•»
rade. were receiving. The appearance of these Communists
naturally amazed the other deputies, but when Pont, began
to address the Chamber about the necessity of ooneluding
the war with Germany, this amazement turned to indignation.
The Communists were ejected f ►aa the hall.°
Another inoident ***stirred in the Chamber on January
9 # 1940 et a session to which all mobilised Parliamentarians
had been invited. Only seven of the twenty-two Communist
lOrtto AMW.,941a. PP. 26.270
P. 27» This author describee the removal of
these ists ass Very brutal affair, but his is the
only evidence of this interpretation
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deputies in uniform attended.' The President proposed a
salute and a vote of appreciation to the armies of the
Republics ' and the whole Chamber rose spontaneously. All
rose, that is, except tour of the Communist deputies:
Orenier, Oyot, Mercier, and Michel,, who refused to join
in the manifestation, despite their colleagues urging.°
They refused to honor the "capitalist aray 4and wire
dragged out of the Chamber.
A year later, Andre Marty concluded his account of
this incident by. maYtatt
Mhet_a satisfaction it ill to the Communists
to have merited the hatred of the Zudeseot. But A
aloe what a new proof of the power of Communing."
On January 16, 1940 Etienne . Pejen„ a prominent Ofto
monist deputy, appeared in the Chamber to protest a pending
bill to expel all Communists from public office. In his
warning that this new "perseoutioe would not defeat the
Communists, he proclaimed:
We will always replan faithful...•to the true.
Dente of the French people .0. to believe that tea.
i"–	, 6' .	7./ e',.	,11r-011 
10eyret„ 6 el.t t , p. 85, cite* this number while
Walter, IkILL AL J , 352, lists ,only five. However, both
acoounti—ffeWd—that only four of remained seated.
°ibid.
%arty, 4112421144, pg, 43.
41111, pp. 45041.
4$
gather with the Soviet Dillon we represent the
true working class cause, the cause of Communism?
The trial of the French Communist deputies. was post*
pealed repeatedly -throughout the winter. Asoordincto ono
author, the reason for this delay was that the officials
were attempting to force the deputies to renounce their
- party affiliations, bat that sines the deputies resolutely
refused, the waiting period was extended.
On March 18, 1940 the trial finally opened; and Marcel
Willard, "the sou1t1of the defense led off by requesting
that tvilaclier " knanet, and Bernet be called as witnesses.Y:. 
These. men Amused themselves, however, and did not take
Part in the proceedings. After the first day of trial, it
became obvious that the defendants were using the bar as
a tribune for the exposition of their doctrine, so the
Military Tribunal ruled that the trial •be held,10 anni5
The prosecution insisted that this step was taken to keep
the trialfrom degenerating into a mass testimonial, but
the defense was outraged. it charged that this deed was
unprecedented in French history and that the political
lesdara feared the. Communists' influence on the public,
Kerty, A., 2414, p. 54.
2,1114A p. 70*
Ado Riedmatten,	p, 91.
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During the trial, the deputies staunohly upheld the
letter to Herriot and supported the Third international, and
their testimony woe strongly defeatist.
weldeek Rootlet told the court,
The aims of this war, on both eideetl have no.thing in seamen with liberty end justice.*
Etienne Pojon risked the Government's representatives,
Shy is war material being officially sent to
Finland' Why has I, Deledier been keeping troops
in readiness ever since February Edewhen we are in
the thick of a wer with dermenrm
The trial °lowed on April 4, 1940. The verdict pro,
nouneed all of the defendants guilty of participating in the
Workers, and Peasants , Group, which propagated the slogans
of the Third International, but found only Bonts and Remstte
guilty of publishing the letter to President Harriet.
In other words (wrote Andre Harty) the Tribunal
itself did not find all the *moused guilty with re.
gird to the letter to Rerrict, which wee the sole
ground (pretext) for their arrest and trial......
Neverthelesa,.the accused were sentenced to the
maximum psnalties*°
;Warty, 224 OA* p. 760
2I d, p * 80.
3Itigr P. 91.
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Many persons have °ensured the French Government for
having denied free speech to the Communists, especially
to the elected' deputies of the people. An English witness
in the trial commented thst he wee *deeply surprised at the
prosecution of members of parliament * *1 Leon Blum approved
the trial but felt that it should have been held before the
Communist deputies were deposed from the Ohamber * 2 it is
probable that the Dalsdier Government, sensing the popular
tension during the *phony ware months, did resort to some
*red«baiting* to divert the public; and one historian be'
'loved that:
The effect was bad, Had the Communist
leaders been given enough freedom to defend Stalin,
they might have mode themselves very unpopular with
the workers, who would have swung around in favour
of the war, But all this persecution aroused in
them feelings ofparty loyaltyeiksoThus the. anti«
Masi working class, which might ooneelvably have
remained antleassi in spit* of the Btalin«Bitler
pact, became pieifist•°
However, in time of war all democracies have bad to
curtail individual liberties to sate extent, and it is in«
possible to know whither the anti-Communist laws actually
aided or hindered Frome in the ware Xt should be roman«
o- t., p a 88*
8de Hiedmatten, 224 2111, p. 91,
3Alexander Worth, The	ht of Francis (New York &
London: Harper & Brothers, p.
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bored that these French Communists were consistently uphold.
ing a government that was allied to Germany, with Whom Frame
was at war.
Quite naturally, the Communist deputies believed that
they had been unjustly persecuted, so . they issued a leaflet
which reviewed their ease and proved to their sotistaetion
their innooenoem This publication eonoluded with the usual
denunciation of the Socialist leaders,
who are nothing more than lacketre of the capital.
eats and who think they are insulting us when they
0811 us nStalinites*"
Thanks to Lenin and Stalin, Communism Is no
longer a speotre but a reality on oneesixth of the
globe.
The Imperialist war having brokewout, the
treS *S*R* has succeeded in limiting the, world cern. ,
age , by liberating thirteen million Byeloraseisna and
Ukrainians • It him established friendly relations
with the. Basted Oates*
Tess we regard the building of decialim in
the V*840* es the first act of the world revolu-
tion which will deliver the peoples from oppression
and war*
Forward to Communism,1
2.1 "Real Wit and Armisqle Period
The Communist propaganda did not change when'the so.
L--
tuft fighting began in April. and Say of 1940. It was still
1Marty, 224. 41 • pp. 1244$0.
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defeatist and it still blamed the British and French Govern.
meats as the aggressors.
The May 1 # 1940 manifesto of the Communist International
ready
In response to the brutal violation by England
and France of the neutrality of the Scandinavian
countries, Germany was forced to enter Denmark and
Norway.
The British and French ear mongers are furious
that the Soviet Union remains neutral in an Imperial.
tat war.
And the clandestine 1' Numal4e.# -on lay 16, 1940, pub..
lished this item*
When two gangsters fight one another, honest
men do not have to aid the one of them, under the
pretext that the other has hit him an illegal blow,
However, on June 6 0 1940 the French Communists sent
a lastominute proposal te the Government, urging the
defense of Parlay
The Communist Party considers it treasonous to
abandon Paris to the Pesoist invaders, It considers
as its first national Outy the organisation of its
defense. For this /till* necessary*
transformTO tro0 the oharsoter of the ware
making it a national war for liberty and in.
dependence;
To free the deputies and Communist milt..
tants from imprisonment, and internment,
...lit° arm the people and to make Peril an
Our eoun
the criminal
ment#, reap°
know* now the consequenoes of
pursued by worthless govern.for sne war, zne oereirs,
impregnable fortress, 1
What is the explanation of this patriotic gesture just
before the fall of Paris? Perhaps the clue is provided by
the feet that this call for the defense of Paris wasn't
issued until June 6 and that the demand was also for the
Communists' release and the arming of the citizens. In
the confusion of a retreating army the Communists as the
only organised group may hove hoped to direct the armed
eitixons in 4 revolutionary coup which would bring the Com-
munists to power.
The Prendh Communists, issued two declarations in July
which seem to indicate that they were still hopeful of co*.
im6 to power,
On :illy 4, 1940 pftmanito (still clandestine) wrote:
It is neecesery that France hove a government
oompoaed of suitable, honest min, who have struggled
against the war, ham. not boon sttaobed to the *apt.
taltata end have given proof of their attachment to
the cause of the people,
On JUly 10, Jeoquee Moles end Maurice Thoree made an
"Appeal to the Peoples
We ask, therefore, authorisation to publish
lie under the form in which it appeared to1
A	*6 rs before the suspension by Daladier*i
oeoupetion,
Never	a greetpeople like ours be On.slaved, and if this people knew how to _show its
dleapproval* Of seeing Yranee , oheined to the BritishImperialist *art, it will know hew to signify to
the present group in power, its desire . to be tree*
Who is able. to restore France'
Xt le. only the working class guided-by. the
Communist- Tarty yhiehAs able*, establish the ref,
birth of Prence0A
During the debates in the French Constituent Assembly
in 1948, the Communists questioned the right of certain
elected deputies to take their seats because they regarded
these deputies as 'collaborationist*" during the war * One:.
-pt these deputies was Frederiok Dupont and in defending him.
self / he oounter•attsoked by asserting that "five days be.
fore the armistice the French ComMunists were negotiating
with the Germans to have 111mv4te appear again**
Here are excerpts from the letter which the Communq.
1sts ere alleged to have sent to a ,0ermen official about
their Publications
44441B111. published by us, would follow a
100Yrst , 1242114A0 Complete text on pp. 974400*
OJ	% Offioial April. 18, 1945 0 p• 9593*
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policy of European pacification and would defend the
conclusion of * Pranoo.0.8oviet friendship pact that
would complement the German.8oviet pact and thus
create conditions for a durable peace*
(Signed) Preens Maurice, Catelost
Jean, and Robert Poisain'
This question of the Communist negotiations about
1 1 2Umanite wee broached again on December 8, 1947 in the
Assembly by Deputy Pierre de Chevigne• Re stated that
Mae* Ginotlin (who became * deputy after the war) was
another Communist Who had approached the Germans on Awe 21,
1940, and he quoted the official government record of her
testimony when she was arrested on Jane 24 by French police*
In it she teattftedt
I was received by Lt. Weber to whom I ex..
planed our pion to. have "Mrs/Atte appear reguo.
larlyikeplie answered that in piliWiple nothing
opposed snob a publication * It was understood
that all the articles were to be first subjected
to the eeniorihip of the Commandant*
The French police commissioner found her guilty of
infractions of the 1930 decrees which dissolved the Commun•
tat Party end which suspended Communist pub/tuitions, so
lime* Oinollin was jailed*
However, several days later the director of the
Petite•PEoquette prison (where Mine * Oinollin was held) sent 
de Riedmatter, ate PP« 96•97•
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a letter to the Attorney .General of the court of appeal
of Paris, The letter. reads:
I have the honor to inform you that in the
course of a visit of the German authorities*
yesterday June 95, in the Roquette prison, the
following prisoners were freed by the order of
Dr * Frits, high councillor for the chief of the
superior German administration at the Chamber of
Deputies:
Reydt Nglantine Denier, Nm * Ginollin.*eteo
Nevertheless., the final authorisation to publish
171umontor,was never obtained by the Communists.
Another event which the •Communists like to cite now
is the one mentioned by Etienne Fajen in the Constuient
Assembly on July 5, 1946. Re deelaredt
On June 10 0 1940 the Communists Jean Moles, 0
Cardette * and Cutfret asked to be sent into oombat?
Rowswer• Fajen didn't mention.that these Communists
were in prison and that June 10 was the period when Thores
was demanding arms for the masses 0.# possibly for revolution
Fraternization with the German soldiers was urged by
the French Communists for a time. The clandestine l'Humsnits
of July 40 1940 wrote:
* Dec . 90 1947, pp 5560*63*
!Ital	 6* 1946, p. 2621.
It is particularly comforting in these unhappy.
.times to see numerous Parisian workers, conversing
smtoably with the German soldiers in the street and
the b r ts Bravo, comrades, continue even if this
does n p ease the bourgeoisie.,s.
• !leptein,Wr 1940 to Zone 2.4.41
A French historian hes recently argued*
Whet the Communist Party saw itself as the only
organised survivor of the 1940 debacle, it made a bid
for the direst leadership of the nation, relying on
Soviet Support and its oen strength to neutralize
the vieteres By the autumn of 1940 this hope had
the Party retired into deeper illegality fink
tended more and more toward belligerency in the war:'
-/
This statement that the French Communists dropped their
attempts at leadership and became more belligerent in the
autumn of 1940 seems to be contradicted by considerable
evidence throughout the winter of 1940 1941.
In September 1940 an illicit issue of 1 1 Bumanite as,
sertedt
But more and more people of 'ranee under,
stand that there Is only one republic possible
in our Gauntry, the French Republics of the Soviets,
which will give men bread, pesos, liberty6Q
lOsyrat, 9.2. 1114., p 109,
$ 4 Rossi, off ,_ cit., p. 2'
oaeratat o no jalp4„ 301.
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Another Communist journal Jeunesse	Promo, also
published in September wrote:
This wsr la not ours. It is an imperialist war.;
me have never believed that the existence of
strong regime in Germany had to constitute an obstacle
between France and Germany* We proclaim without reti.
cones that it we had directed the destinies of Frens,
in :one 1240, as the Bolsheviks directed the destinies
of Russia in 191S, we would have ended the- war„ we
would have signed the peace as the Bolsheviks signed
it In /9/20A
And in a %Otter to the Communists* of the North Suburb*
in November 1940*
The Communists, the workers, the, peasants, the
true Frenchmen de not have to choose between a ?Orin
and a de diulle, between a Leval end s Churohill, be.
twee' one imperialism end another imperialism
The right road is the one that the Russian
workers followed in 1911**	Is regime of the Soviets'
is alone capable of givl ,people bread and lib.
erty in security and peg
On December 19, 1940 Fran-eels , Billoux, one of the im.
prisoned Communist deputy 	wrote a letter to Marshal
retain* The (wends of this long text concerned the feet
that the Communists, who had steadily denounced both the
war and the men like Daladier who led it, ought to be freed
and reinstated in public life beosase a new and anti*Daledisr
114411f,vre* 224.510 1)+116.
2°41714" MOLMOr P; 102;
53
.government had come to power and the war was over. Billoux
also waked that while waiting for this just step to be taken
he might receive food parcels at the prison end hia wife end
child might visit him. In order to denounce Daladi►r and
his Government, "who are truly responsible for the war," he
offered to testify es a witness against Deladier„ Blum, and
the rest in Vichy l s Blom trial, And Billoux concluded,
"'Kindly eeeept the assurance of my high esteem. "1
During the debates in the Assembly on December 21, 1947,
one of the deputies scoulted Billoux, with an excerpt from
this letter, of a subservience to Petain.
I wrote retain, answered Billoux) net to ask
for my freedom, but car. the contrary, T - proved thatI did not cringe before him by indieeting that
did not ask for my froislion• t demanded of Main
that I be allowed to go to the Rim Trial in order
to indicate those responsible for theaver„ meaning
them Potato, Level, and the others.°
One mast have a very active Imagination besides an
*batty to pass over certain passages, in order to arrive
at the same interpretation of this 1940 letter which Billoux
offered in 1947,
There is one pie*. of evidence that has been used to
show that the Communists were in the resistance movement
10eyret, 12„, 211„ p. 106.108.
2. 114 Itatte, Dec. 22, 1947 pp. 602006021.
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against Hitler as early as the winter of 19406 Marcel
Rosenblatt ' en Alsatian Communist, later testified that the
*Communist party from Deoember 1940 distributed illegal
tracts to promote an uprising against the annexation of
ilsase ..Lorraine." It should be remembered, though, that
the Communists hod been urging the independence movement
in Aloes..Lorraine against Franoo in the twenties, so this
war hardly evident,• of Communist participation in Frew&
resistance actions In 1940.
The olandsatine l'Eumanito of Karon 18 1941 said*
The movement of de Gaulle and Larminat, funda»
mentally reactionary and onti.demooratio, alms also
at nothingether than depriving our coRntry of all
liberty in case of an English viatery.°
The Goal miners of northern, Prone* participated in
strikes in May 1941 0 and since the summer of 1941 the dom.
munists have claimed to have organised those strikes * Row.
over, there seems to be no evidenoe at that time which would
point to Communist instigation of those strikes. 8o it is
probable that the 4iners struck over heel grievances and
that.. the CommUnists later claimed this incidence as one of
their antimaissi actions before Zone 1941,
OVA*1 ,0111,Oiel, Dee. 12, 1947, p. 8701.
2de Siadmatten,	p• 98.
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During the last part Of Way the U.8#640 R 4 and Germany
were finding it increasingly difficult to remain on friendly
term** In France in this same period the Communist* began
launching an appeal for a °Notional Front* against the
invaders, But perhaps indicative that this early move was
only a reflection of the Moscow situation t* the feet that
this appeal made nap 'aetual statement concerning German.
Soviet relations and it Continued to abuse de Gaulle and
Brittitz;
Certain Frenchmen who suffer by seeing our
oountry impressed by the invader wrongly plea*
their hopes in the de Gaulle movement, To these
oempetriots we say that it is not basking such
movement of resotion and colonialism in the
imperiali st British image that the unity of the
French nation* for the national liberation *an
be realised#'
After *lune 22f however, the French Communists entered
into the antimGerman resistance with the seal characteristic
of Communist campaigns and from that period they have a
patriotic reword to which they constantly refer today,
3.0eyrat, 221. 211A P. 1264,
CHAPTER IV	 .kI
THE PROS AND CONS OF THE "DEL CAT /*IOW'
1	 ,\
■
The French Communists today olaimthat during, the per\
ed of the Nesi.Seviet Pact they follow 6d 	 b th eon.
*intent and oorreot for Prone. * In fe44, Marto
in his report to the Party Congress of4une 1946 '
we alone Of. the French partieS ere able t
up *gain word for word our speeches ourYeritin
our resolutions, And our acts have always coot
to our. words`* For the Communists iissfwhir* theyend they de what they say.A
With the preceding chepter as a ual biekgroundOet
us try to (Wide whether the French Coltunist 1 ,Svity, s policy
in this period woe consistent, whether t arstu41y aimed at
the welfare of France, and whether the ifustifio tione whist%
the Communists give for it ere valid, 1
In the first plat)* * the inconsisteniT of th Party
line is obvious, The number of shocks tee which e Party
had to adapt itself, espeoinily in September 1939* was hard.
1Y sonduelve to a consistent volley* There is a
contradiction after October 1 of the pro.war stateWts
which the Party mode up to September. 19, with the interval
1Thores * tat	304.
etc
evidently required as a period of reorganization, The de.
featiem which the French Communists practiced throughout the
winter of 1939 and the spring of 1940 was abruptly reversed
in a sudden "patriotio demand" for the define* of Parts in
June 1940. However, the Communist actions immediately fol.
lowing this "pill to arm the citizens" point to the pro.
livability that the defeatism had boon dropped only when the
situation seemed such that the Communists might have used
it to gain strength in France, During the remainder of
1940 end the early half of 1941, the Party continued its
defeatism in regard to the Cermen.British conflict end 04,10
4
timid to place the war guilt on the British and French
governments, Only during the month before the German in.^
vision of Russia did the French Communists start in the,
direction of an anti.Corman resistance movement, and we
now know that Neel . .Soviet relations were definitely crack.
ing by that time. On Arne 22, 1941 the French Communists
dropped defeatism completely and embraced all groups, ino
eluding de Gaulle l s and the British, which would aid in the
defeat of Oormeny* Therefore, this period seems only tee
add to the elidenoe that demonstrates that Communist Parties
closely fellow the Mosoow line end consequently often appor
to have inconsistent policies.
However, boeause the Party's line was inconsistent, it
doom not necessarily follow that this volley wee hurting
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France. When Mewl** Mores explained the Pertyl e September
1939 actions, he Charged thet the Communists supported the
war at first, but that the Government lot Germany erase
Poland without a struggle by the Fronsh. So when Poland
was lest, the Communists saw no reason to continue the *sr.
/t is true that Prance might have helped Poland if she had
attaok,d Germany's N4Wrogion immediately,'but now that we
know that ,the Soviet had planned to grab the eastern half
of Poland as early as August 93„ it seems improbable that
Prance could have waved the Polish State even if she had
atruok at Germany. Warn, of course, the U.S.S.R. might
have dropped her portioning plans if Francs had offootive/y
challenged Germany. We shall never know the answer to, this
"histories]. if."
When the Communists review the sort of peace terms
which !Mier always demanded, it is difficult to renders
stand they can still Claim that their defeatism was the
wisest course in 1939 and 1940. Somehow, it seems that
if the Communists bad applied their energies toward stimu*
lilting the prosecution of the oar as enthusiastically ss
they did tewerd defeating it in  that crucial year, the
final, showdown with Germany might have been accomplished
much sooner then 1945. No one will deny that the French
Government during, this period had definite failings and
weaknesses, but the method Of , defeatism which the Communists
%Mores, 2g1,
gibid„ p 284.
3Ibid.
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chose brought no aid to the French situation and only aceenw
tuat•d and prolreked graver governmental errors,
The justification* which the French aommntiOtS make for
the Soviet line (and oonsequently their own) during those
Years ere -based en, a few patohwork.wraets, For instance,
they argue that the follies deliberately left the Soviet
alone so that Hitler would attack her and besides, that Brit,
aim and Prance actively prepared to attack Russia themselve4
These are offered as the reasons for Ruesion.bacceptance
of the Oerman.Soviet pact ' However, Thor's, who quotes
Daladier l s statement about troops win readiness to be sent
against Russia through Finlandomand SyriN4 in order to
prove the foregoing point, roiled to mention that these
allied preparations occurred long after the GermanipSoviet
poet, and, iu foot, were partly a result of it.
?bores cited AnAr• Pierre** book; Stalin Against.,RWor
to refute the IfinfamoUa slander" that Russel* helped parti.
tion Polendi
It woe only when most of the Polish ministersstud generals had taken refuge in fitments, when the
polish State had proetioallyeees•d to exist, thatthe Red Army entered. Poland.
p. 260,
90
But Thores must have forgotten that the whole won d
knows that the V,S,S,R, had agreed to partition Poland al
early as August 93, when the German.8oviet pact wes signed,
The Communists also assert that the reprosehes which
the French Government hurled at them about their Volleying
the Soviet line in September 1939 were only a pretott,
Actually, according 'to these Oommunists, they have proof
that the Government had planned since 'Daly 1939 to persecute
them, Their evident)* is a quotation from the Government's
Yellow Book and is a phrase in the minutes recorded by
George Bonnet on his conversation with Graf von welseok,
German Ambassador in Paris, on July 1, 1939s
finally sold to the Ambassador that he
could observe in Frazee a unanimous national
movement in support of the Government; elections
would be suspended, public meetings banned, all
attempt* at foreign propaganda repres'ed„ and the
Communists brought to their senses..44'
This evidence must be weighed to determine its true
value, In the first plies, although Bonnet was the Foreign
Minister at that time, he was not the Government and there
fore s statement of hie would not necessarily represent the
opinion of the whole Oebinet. It la generally recognised
that Bonnet was in favor of a Pranco.Germsn understanding
and that he was very anti.Oommunist so this remark seems
31fierty, M Alp pp 112,
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in oharootOrS however, it should be noted that the Communists
never quote the whole °envoy:Haien between Bennet and von
welseek and it is possible that the oemplete text might
give a different interpretation. Therefore, this evidence
does not seem adequate for the Oemmuniste i serious satuse.
tion.
_On the whole, the evidence which the Communists elite
to $ustify the Communist line from 1939 to 1041 is verb
te►141, but tt is •Vvious that there must be many Communists
who are intelligent enough to reseh this same oenclusion if
they are pressed to defend thee. jostifieations. Thus we
must reeegnise that the basic premise from which Communists
work is one of faith .. ea belief that Communism will benefit
all people (end therefore, Propels) and that the Soviet Union
must be preserved as the protestor of Communist ideology.
se Oommunist leaders ecteept say policy no matter how eon*
trsd.totory it might appear to be (to the non.Cemmunist)
to the beet interests of Fromm, it it aids in the preserve..
tion of the V,5 S.R.
GHAMIR V
00SOLOSXON
The French Oeantuntsts do not deny that they pursue e
course aImilar to that of the 1705 .8 * R * ,•and yet Whey re".
pestedly affirm that this pelley is never disloyal tit ?ranee
booms* the interests of the Soviet Union and of the Premeh
people ere the same.
They justify their motions and those of the Soviet
Union (with evidence which, upon objective scrutiny, is
only partial and half true) beesuse the final result was
victory, The Communists subordinate the period from 1939
to 1941 to that one from 1941 to 1945, beesuse the policies
of the latter period brought success * After ell, today
the Soviet Union is one of the world's two greatest powers
and the French Communists are *heroes of the Resistance
**uric* Therea t in commenting on t -e ftnel notion br-Whe
Soviet' Union which aided in the allied victory, could not
understand bow some V41,1 could eriticiae the U .54 0 1/, now,
and asked, "Where would France be, where would the world
be without the Soviet Uniontwi
Mores o allip P. 286,
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But he roiled to realise that later Communist sett...AO
against the fascist powers no matter how important, do not
justify that period when the Communist* gave at least pas.
sire assistance to Germany b assuring Hitler thatldli.
eastern borders would not be threatened 'hat he attacked
the west * Fate was with the Communists the last war .
because their widely*oontrediotory vacillations ended on
the winning side) but it is dangerous to ehange owes stand*
srds end one's methods too radically, even for an objective
one considers valuable*
A wile man one. said,
It a man uses foul means to gain an ends ne
matter how laudibles he usually loses sight of that
end on the way*
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